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The Baby M case 1 has forced us to 
take sides in the public debate over 
surrogate motherhood. Last year, 
advocates of this form of noncoital 
reproduction praised the New Jersey 
trial court2 for supporting the free-
dom to contract for such "womb 
renting" services, while critics 
warned that enforcement of such 
surrogacy contracts would condone 
the sale of babies and the exploita-
tion of women as baby factories. In 
its unanimous opinion, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court sided with the 
critics. 3 Based on New Jersey's 
adoption law and public policy, the 
court refused to enforce the contract 
that provided money to a surrogate 
mother in return for her agreeing to 
be artificially inseminated with the 
semen of another woman's husband, 
to conceive a child, to carry it to 
term, and to relinquish her parental 
rights and surrender her child to the 
natural father and his wife, regard-
less of the child's best interests. The 
court believed that its "declaration 
that this surrogacy contract is unen-
forceable and illegal is sufficient to 
deter similar agreements."4 
The court was particularly of-
fended by the payment of money in 
exchange for bearing and relinquish-
ing a baby. "There are," it said, "in 
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a civilized society, some things that 
money cannot buy."5 Payment of 
money to the surrogate was "illegal, 
perhaps criminal, and degrading to 
women."6 The court found "no 
offense" to present laws where a 
woman serves as a surrogate with-
out payment, provided she is not 
subject to a binding agreement to 
surrender her child. 7 Nor did it pre-
clude the legislature from altering 
the statutory scheme to permit sur-
rogacy contracts, within constitu-
tional limits-limits that the court 
did not define and that are not easily 
definable. 
The court concluded its ninety-
five-page opinion with a predic-
tion-and perhaps a hope for the fu-
ture: 
Legislative consideration of sur-
rogacy may also provide the 
opportunity to begin to focus 
on the overall implications of 
the new reproductive biotech-
nology .... The problem can be 
addressed only when society 
decides what its value and ob-
jectives are in this troubling, yet 
promising, area. 8 
Perhaps this is why legislatures 
have had so much trouble passing 
laws in this area. Although bills have 
been introduced in the majority of 
states, as well as Congress, to either 
ban or regulate surrogacy, most 
have died in committee. The Baby M 
decision, however, has stimulated 
debate and has influenced the direc-
tion of recent legislation. New Jer-
sey's Supreme Court is well re-
spected nationwide for its leadership 
in analyzing complex ethical issues. 
What impact will its analysis have 
on those states where surrogacy con-
tracts will continue to be written in a 
legal wasteland? For couples desper-
ate to have':a child, for women des-
perate for money, and for brokers 
desperate to get rich, the risks may 
still be worth taking. 
But what about the role of the 
health professional in the surrogacy 
process? What issues have been clar-
ified by the Baby M decision and the 
surrogacy contract? What questions 
still remain unanswered? And, what 
new questions have been raised? 
To put such questions in some 
context, it is worth noting that nine-
teen amicus briefs were filed with 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
this case, expressing various inter-
ests and views on surrogacy. In fact, 
the court specifically acknowledged 
that many of them were helpful in 
resolving the issues. 9 Yet not one 
brief was filed on behalf of a health-
professional association. One can 
only speculate that such groups did 
not view the Baby M case as a rele-
vant case of nationwide importance 
and/or that they had not officially 
considered their positions on surro-
gacy. Not one of the major mental 
health associations, including the 
American Psychological Association 
and the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, had officially considered the 
issue. In fact, very little evidence has 
appeared in any of the scientific 
journals on surrogacy. Either the 
Baby M decision will increase de-
mand for evidence on the effects of 
surrogacy or it will dry up interest. 
Or, perhaps, the issue is just too 
controversial for health-professional 
groups struggling for consensus. 
Yet as early as 1983, the Judicial 
Council of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) and the Execu-
tive Board of the American College 
of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
(ACOG) issued policy statements on 
surrogacy. 10 As late as September 
1987, the ~-\..c'viA affirmed its opposi-
tion to surrogacy to the Drafting 
Committee on the "Status of Chil-
dren of the New Biology" of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws: "Surrogate 
parent contracts do not represent a 
satisfactory reproductive alternative 
for those who wish to become 
parents." 11 The AMA opposed state 
legislation to sanction such arrange-
ments. 
Although ACOG is reevaluating 
its position in light of the Baby M 
decision, its present ethical guide-
lines do not condemn the practice. 
They do, however, express "signifi-
cant reservations about this ap-
proach to parenthood." Of particu-
lar concern is the difficulty of differ-
entiating between payments for the 
service of carrying the child and the 
payment for the child itself-clearly 
a practice that is "illegal and mor-
ally objectionable." ACOG also 
warns against investing in surrogacy 
businesses or accepting money for 
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recruiting or referring potential sur-
rogates. The physician "should not 
participate in a surrogate program 
where the financial arrangements 
are likely to exploit any of the 
parties." Yet in the end, the decision 
about whether to participate in a 
surrogacy arrangement is left up to 
the physician. Such a decision 
should be made only after the phy-
sician has weighed all the "legal, 
psychological, societal, medical and 
ethical aspects." 12 
In 1986, the Ethics Committee of 
the American Fertility Society issued 
its report on "Ethical Consider-
ations of the New Reproductive 
Technologies."' 3 The committee 
concluded that if surrogate mother-
hood is pursued, it should be as a 
"clinical experiment." 14 Unfortu-
nately, this experiment will not an-
swer the current concerns about the 
enforceability of the surrogate con-
tract and the custody of the child. In 
fact, a few members of the commit-
tee questioned whether, given the 
small number of couples involved, it 
was likely that significant research 
would be performed. Others would 
not endorse a procedure that was so 
highly controversial and whose 
risk-benefit ratio did not justify 
support. 15 
In spite of the fact that these 
groups did not play an active role in 
the Baby M appeal, the court's deci-
sion and its potential impact on the 
surrogacy contract continue to raise 
a number of unanswered questions 
for the health care professional. Will 
participation in such arrangements 
carry a taint of immorality-and 
perhaps a threat of criminality? Will 
exposure to professional liability in-
crease with more demand for screen-
ing, counseling, and evaluation? 
Will future regulation place health 
care professionals in the role of 
"guarantors" of the agreement? At 
various stages of the surrogacy pro-
cess, the professional is faced with a 
number of complex questions, many 
with no answers. By examining the 
Baby M case and its surrogacy con-
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tract, this article highlights these un-
answered questions and the implica-
tions for health care professionals. 
The "Perhaps Criminal" Role 
The Baby M case was a dispute 
about a contract and the custody of 
Baby M, not about criminal liability. 
Yet the court stated, albeit in dic-
tum, that the surrogate arrangement 
was "perhaps criminal" under New 
Jersey law. 16 What are the implica-
tions of this confusing phrase? 
New Jersey law prohibits the use 
of money in connection with adop-
tions. Violation of this "baby 
selling" law is a high misdemeanor, 
a third-degree crime carrying a 
three-to five-year prison term. 17 Ex-
cepted are fees of an approved 
agency and payment or reimburse-
ment for medical, hospital, or re-
lated expenses incurred in connec-
tion with the birth of the child. Al-
though the Baby M contract 
provided that the fees paid were for 
services and expenses, the court con-
cluded that the parties knew it was 
nothing other than a private-
placement adoption for money. The 
contract provided for "the sale of a 
child, or at the very least, the sale of 
a mother's right to her child, the 
only mitigating factor being that one 
of the purchas'e,rs is the father." 18 
The court concluded that the 
evils that prompted the prohibition 
against the payment of money in 
connection with adoption are pres-
ent in the surrogacy arrangement. In 
both cases, "the essential evil is the 
same, taking advantage of the wom-
an's circumstances (the unwanted 
pregnancy or the need for money) in 
order to take away the child." In the 
court's view, it was the middle-
man-the surrogate broker-
motivated by the profit motive, who 
promotes the sale. The profit mo-
tive-and not the best interests of 
the parties-"predominates, perme-
ates, and ultimately governs the 
transaction." 1 9 
The court never mentioned the 
role of the health professional in the 
context of the baby-selling prohibi-
tion. Yet the taint of immorality and 
possible criminality permeates the 
court's analysis. To date, twenty-
four states have enacted laws pro-
hibiting baby-selling. 20 If baby-
selling laws are interpreted to cover 
the surrogacy arrangement, they 
may be interpreted broadly enough 
to subject a health care professional 
to criminal liability for his or her 
participation. 21 Moreover, since 
Baby "\f was decided, at least five 
states have passed statutes restrict-
ing commercial surrogacy. 22 The 
Baby ~1 contract provided for arti-
ficial insemination, for a fee, by a 
physician. The contract provided for 
evaluation, for a fee, by a psychia-
trist. The contract provided for the 
inseminating physician, for a fee, to 
make judgments about genetic test-
ing. Health professionals legitimized 
the "medical" aspects of the process. 
By their actions, they sanctioned the 
deal. Without the involvement of the 
health care professionals, would the 
surrogate arrangement be as profit-
able? Would it continue to be char-
acterized as a reproductive "technol-
ogy"? Does the participation of the 
health care professional-although 
not critical to the deal-contribute 
to its success as a "medical" solution 
to infertility? Unless the health care 
professional also serves as a broker, 
referral service, and/or owner of a 
surrogacy agency, it is highly un-
likely that there would be fair notice 
under most existing state laws to be 
criminally liable. 23 Yet the charge of 
"aiding and abetting" a crime would 
not be out of the question. 
A more realistic fear for the 
health care professional may be the 
impact of characterizing the surro-
gacy process as immoral, illegal, and 
"perhaps criminal." Will profession-
als want to take the risk? Will health 
professionals disassociate them-
selves from surrogacy? At what 
price? Criminalization of surrogacy 
may drive the business under-
ground, without sufficient quality 
Law, Medicine & Health Care 
control. In the meantime, without 
further legislative clarification, the 
hint of potential criminality should 
at least cause those professionals 
participating in a surrogacy contract 
to analyze their role throughout the 
process. In the end, they may be 
faced with even more unanswered 
questions. 
Pre-Insemination: Evaluation, 
Counseling, and "Informed 
Consent" 
Contrary to all the protection pro-
vided for counseling prior to termi-
nation of parental rights, the court 
found that the surrogacy contract 
did not provide for "counseling, in-
dependent or otherwise, of the nat-
ural mother, no evaluation, no 
warning." 24 The lack of counseling 
and evaluation reinforced the 
court's determination to void the 
agreement. 
Apparently the only psychologi-
cal evaluation performed on Ms. 
Whitehead took place almost two 
years prior to her agreement with 
Mr. Stern. According to the trial 
court, Ms. Whitehead received a 
"psychological evaluation to deter-
mine her suitability as a potential 
surrogate candidate" at the Infertil-
ity Center of New York (ICNY). Al-
though the "examiner" thought it 
important to explore her ability to 
relinquish the child in more depth, 
she was recommended as an appro-
priate candidate. "It was this fact of 
prior evaluation that the Stems re-
lied on." 2 5 According to the trial 
court, Ms. Whitehead also testified 
that she received two counseling ses-
sions at ICNY, a point ignored by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court raised a 
number of concerns about the role 
of evaluation and counseling. It 
questioned whether the evaluation 
served anyone but ICNY. 26 Nothing 
in the record stated that the evalua-
tion was for the surrogate's benefit. 
To the contrary: Ms. Whitehead tes-
tified that all she was told was that 
"she had passed."27 The Sterns 
never asked to see the evaluation. 
They assumed that ICNY had made 
an evaluation and "had concluded 
that there was no danger that the sur-
rogate would change her mind."28 
The court stressed the fact that a 
psychologist had warned that Ms. 
Whitehead demonstrated cer_tain 
traits that "might make surrender of 
the child difficult and that there 
should be further inquiry." The 
court speculated that to inquire fur-
ther may have jeopardized the deal, 
believing that the "profit motive got 
the better" of ICNY.29 
The court ignored the provision 
in the contract that specifically 
stated that a "psychiatric" evalua-
tion was to be arranged for both Mr. 
and Ms. Whitehead, to be paid for 
by Mr. Stern, and that the White-
heads were to sign a release permit-
ting dissemination of the evaluation 
report to ICNY or the Sterns.3° Did 
this evaluation ever take place as 
provided in the contract? If so, what 
were the results? Is this the evalua-
tion the Supreme Court was describ-
ing? Or did the Sterns waive this 
contract provision and rely on the 
evaluation done almost two years 
earlier by a clinical psychologist on 
contract with ICNY? 
The facts are not clear from the 
record. What is clear is that the 
court envisioned a process of both 
evaluation and counseling. A more 
in-depth evaluation would have fo-
cused on the likelihood of Ms. 
Whitehead changing her mind, 
while extensive counseling would 
have alerted her to the potential im-
pact of relinquishing her child. 
Should the mental health profes-
sional be in a position to guarantee 
that a mother won't change her 
mind or that her consent is volun-
tary? Is this an assessment that the 
court would agree was impossible 
until after birth?31 How would the 
professional make such assess-
ments? What traits, in fact, should 
the professional look for-stability, 
pecuniary motives, detachment, 
sensitivity?32 Will the surrogate with 
a detached personality have the eas-
iest time relinquishing, but also be 
most unconcerned during the preg-
nancy? Perhaps the most sensitive 
person would feel a sense of duty to 
the infertile couple and find it easiest 
to relinquish a child. What was it 
about Ms. Whitehead's personality 
that caused doubt? Do psychologists 
on contract with a surrogacy agency 
ever recommend that a candidate 
not be approved? If the initial eval-
uation raises questions, do you stop 
there? Or should the mental health 
professional re-evaluate following 
counseling? Should counseling in-
clude surrogate "support groups" in 
which the surrogate candidate can 
minimize her feelings of doubt? And 
how often should evaluations take 
place? For example, would the Baby 
M court require evaluation and 
counseling each month prior to in-
semination? 
The court speculated that if ei-
ther the Sterns or Ms. Whitehead 
had been told the details of the eval-
uation, the agreement would never 
have been made. 33 The evaluation, if 
shared, might have warned both 
parties and put them on notice. The 
court pointed out that both parties 
suffered severe emotional distress, 
which could have been avoided with 
proper evaluation and full disclosure 
and counseling. 34 Yet the contract 
between Mr. Stern and ICNY made 
it quite clear that ICNY would "not 
guarantee or warrant" that the sur-
rogate would comply, including, but 
not limited to, her "refusal to sur-
render custody of the child upon 
birth."35 Mr. Stern also specifically 
released ICNY from any liability 
"related to or arising from any 
agreement or understanding be-
tween himself and a 'surrogate 
mother' located through the services 
of ICNY."36 
The court questioned whether, 
even with sufficient evaluation and 
counseling, a surrogate could ever 
grant "informed consent" to the 
terms of the surrogate contract. Tra-
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ditionally, informed consent re-
quires that the patient be told of the 
risks and benefits of the treatment 
options. For the trial court, in-
formed consent was defined as a 
"concept used in the trial of medical 
malpractice cases." The trial court 
rejected Ms. Whitehead's argument 
that until she "felt the emotion of 
birth and sensed the child, she could 
not give informed consent at the 
time she signed the contract." To ac-
cept this expanded concept of in-
formed consent would put "all con-
tracts in limbo."37 
On the contrary, the Supreme 
Court was concerned not so much 
with informed consent to a medical 
procedure (the insemination proce-
dure is a simple, non-material risk) 
but, rather, with the consent to re-
linquish the baby at the time of sign-
ing the contract. The court em-
braced a broad definition of in-
formed consent that is somewhat 
foreign to contract law. A standard 
contract requires only that both 
parties are competent at the time 
the agreement is made. In fact, the 
contract stated that both parties 
"freely and voluntarily" signed the 
agreement. 38 
Perhaps the court deemed it 
"impossible" and/or "impractic-
able" for a natural mother to con-
sent to relinquish her child until a 
reasonable time after birth. Without 
any scientific evidence cited, the 
court took judicial notice that the 
"natural mother is irrevocably com-
mitted before she knows the 
strength of her bond with her child." 
In the "most important sense" her 
decision is "uninformed."39 
As a practical matter, what 
should the consent process include? 
Is a health care professional quali-
fied to disclose the medical, psycho-
logical, legal, and financial risks and 
benefits of the surrogate contract? 
How certain is any of this informa-
tion? The medical risks associated 
with insemination and pregnancy 
are currently to be disclosed. But 
what about the long-term psycho-
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logical risks to the parties, their fam-
ilies, and the child? Furthermore, the 
uncertainty of the legal and financial 
issues clouds consent even more. At 
best, "informed consent" will be a 
warning to all potential parties 
about all foreseeable risks. 
Some states may attempt to reg-
ulate surrogacy by delineating stan-
dards for screening, evaluation, 
counseling, and informed consent 
prior to the signing of a contract. 
For example, recent proposals re-
quire the surrogate and the natural 
father to submit to physical and ge-
netic screening. The surrogate may 
also be required to undergo psycho-
logical evaluation to determine 
whether any medical disability 
would prevent her from abiding by 
the terms of the contract. A few pro-
posals require that a licensed mar-
riage counselor, psychologist, or 
psychiatrist certify that "the conse-
quences and responsibilities of sur-
rogate parenthood" were explained 
to the natural father and his wife, 
that "the surrogate had the capacity 
to consent," and that "the potential 
psychological consequence of her 
consent" had been discussed. 40 Pro-
posals in Connecticut and Hawaii, 
for example, prohibit insemination 
unless the "physician is profession-
ally satisfied with the mental and 
physical suitability of the surrogate 
and the natural father."4 1 
Such requirements seem to put 
the health care professional in the 
position of "guarantor" of the sur-
rogacy process. Will professionals 
have to guarantee or warrant that 
the mother will not change her 
mind, that the medical and genetic 
makeup of all the parties proves ac-
ceptable, that the psychological 
evaluation assures no problems, and 
that the parties have been warned of 
all risks? 
Such attempts at regulation may 
transform surrogacy from a com-
mercial enterprise to a medically 
controlled reproductive choice. 
With more involvement of health 
care professionals, will the surro-
gacy process be legitimized? Is this a 
role that health care professionals 
want to accept? If so, who will mon-
itor their compliance with the stan-
dards? Will such a role increase pro-
fessional liability? What will the 
standard of care be for assessing 
their role in the pre-conception deal? 
And what if the deal falls apart? The 
legal and ethical risks should force 
health care professionals to become 
more involved in evaluating propos-
als for surrogacy regulation. 
Insemination 
In the typical surrogacy arrange-
ment, the surrogate candidate is ar-
tificially inseminated with the semen 
of another woman's husband. This 
process does not require any com-
plex reproductive technology. A 
physician's expertise is not essential. 
In fact, artificial insemination can be 
done at home with a turkey baster. 
State laws regulate artificial insemi-
nation to varying degrees.42 In a few 
states it is a criminal offense for any-
one other than a licensed physician 
to perform artificial insemination. 43 
The Baby M contract specifically 
provided that the surrogate would 
be "artificially inseminated with the 
semen of the natural father by a 
physician. "44 Although contracts 
may vary as to the role of screening 
and evaluation at the pre-conception 
stage, it is clear that the physician 
takes a role in beginning the concep-
tion process. Prior to each attempt, 
the sperm donor and the surrogate 
should be screened for sexually 
transmitted diseases. As in the Baby 
M case, insemination may be tried a 
number of times before conception 
occurs. 
The health care professional's in-
volvement is necessary for the surro-
gacy contract to proceed (assuming 
the parties reject the at-home tur-
key-baster method and sexual inter-
course}. The physician benefits fi-
nancially from this process. He or 
she is paid a fee for this service and 
may have contracted with the surra-
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gate agency to inseminate and screen 
all surrogates. Does the inseminating 
physician also have a physician-
patient relationship with the surro-
gate and the natural father, or is this 
strictly a business relationship with 
the surrogacy agency? 
Prenatal Care 
Once insemination is successful and 
conception occurs, the contract may 
provide for a continuing role for the 
inseminating physician. How does 
the surrogacy contract shape medi-
cal decision-making, and how does 
it affect the health care professional? 
The Baby M contract set out a 
number of specific terms related to 
prenatal care. First, Ms. Whitehead 
agreed not to abort unless, "in the 
professional medical opinion of the 
inseminating physician" it was nec-
essary for her "physical health" or 
the child had been found to be 
"physiologically abnormal." Fur-
thermore, "upon the request" of the 
inseminating physician, she would 
agree to "undergo amniocentesis or 
similar tests to detect genetic and 
congenital defects. "45 
These provisions place all the de-
cision-making authority with the in-
seminating physician. What rela-
tionship does this physician have to 
the surrogate? What role does her 
independent obstetrician have in her 
care? To what extent does the in-
seminating physician know of her 
physical health-and what about 
her emotional health? Does the in-
seminating physician take orders 
from the surrogate agency and/or 
those who pay his or her fee? Will 
the profit motive "get the best of" 
the physician under these circum-
stances? In spite of the contract, it 
was Mr. Stern's wife, a physician 
herself, who insisted that Ms. 
Whitehead undergo amniocentesis. 
The actual role of any other physi-
cian is unknown from the record. 4 6 
The Baby M contract provided 
that the surrogate would receive no 
compensation if she miscarried prior 
to the fifth month.47 What if an or-
dered amniocentesis had brought 
about a miscarriage? Who would 
have the cause of action against 
which physician? If the baby had 
been stillborn subsequent to the 
fourth month, Ms. Whitehead 
would have received only $ 1 ,ooo. 48 
Would the surrogate and the natural 
father have a cause of action against 
the physician for negligence if they 
could prove the physician caused the 
stillbirth? Could the mother sue for 
the difference of the $g,ooo and her 
expenses? Could the father sue for 
all his expenses? Obviously, if the 
contract is unenforceable, the con- . 
tract remedy would not be available; 
but what about a potential negli-
gence case? Could all parties estab-
lish a duty of the professional to 
provide a perfect, final "product"? 
The Baby M contract did pro-
vide that if prenatal testing revealed 
any defects, the surrogate, "upon 
demand" of Mr. Stern, would abort 
the fetus or forfeit the money.49 
Even the trial court determined that 
this provision was clearly void and 
unenforceable.so Relying on Roe v. 
Wade,5' it found "[t]hat only the 
woman has the constitutionally pro-
tected right to determine the manner 
in which her body and person shall 
be used."52 
In anori}er contract provision ig-
nored by both courts, the surrogate 
would agree "to adhere to all medi-
cal instructions given to her by the 
inseminating physician as well as her 
independent obstetrician."53 But 
what if there had been a conflict be-
tween the physicians? Was Ms. 
Whitehead the patient of both 
physicians?54 Did she have a rela-
tionship only with her independent 
physician? And if so, why should the 
inseminating physician have a role 
in her prenatal care? Because the 
contract said so? And which physi-
cian's instructions was she to con-
sider? 
The contract further set out that 
Ms. Whitehead was not to "smoke 
cigarettes, drink alcoholic bever-
ages, use illegal drugs, or take non-
prescription medications or pre-
scribed medications without written 
consent from her physician. " 5 5 
Which physician was this? What if 
she had told her "independent" phy-
sician that she had been drinking or 
smoking cigarettes in violation of 
the contract? And what if she had 
missed a scheduled appointment as 
set out in the contract? Was her phy-
sician supposed to write these facts 
in the chart because they are medi-
cally relevant, or should he or she 
not put such facts in her record be-
cause they violate the contract? 
Should the physician report compli-
ance or lack thereof to anyone else? 
Should a copy of the contract and its 
terms be placed in the surrogate's 
medical record? What if she gives 
the contract to her physician or the 
surrogate agency sends it to him or 
her? Should the physician-whose 
interest is in protecting the welfare 
of the patient and the fetus5 6-
ignore the contract and act as if it 
doesn't exist? 
Since her "independent obste-
trician" is not part of the business 
deal, maybe the surrogate will not 
tell this physician about the con-
tract. Does she have a reason to 
"deceive" her doctor? Would the 
doctor and the staff treat her differ-
ently? Her physician might be better 
off not knowing about the terms of 
the contract and its "rules" on med-
ical decision-making. It certainly 
would make the situation less com-
plicated. Yet this information may 
be relevant to her prenatal care. 
What if her blood pressure began to 
rise? Such a reaction could be due to 
the ambivalence she feels about giv-
ing up the child--or maybe she fears 
that if she refuses to give up the child 
she will be sued. And what about the 
stress that her husband may feel 
about her pregnancy? 11aybe her 
children are pressuring her not to 
give up the baby. Shouldn't her phy-
sician have this information? The 
physician may believe that the stress 
of the arrangement is causing psy-
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chological and potential physical 
harm to the mother and the fetus. 
With this information, what should 
the physician do? Should he or she 
order counseling to reduce the 
mother's feelings of stress and bond-
ing, or should counseling be directed 
toward validating her "natural" 
feelings about not wanting to relin-
quish the child-the possible posi-
tion of the Baby M court? 
What benefits the surrogate 
medically may not benefit her finan-
cially if she refuses to relinquish the 
baby. Is this a risk the surrogate as-
sumes? Should the natural father 
pay all these expenses as foreseeable 
under the arrangement, whether or 
not the mother decides to keep the 
baby? The Baby 11 contract pro-
vided that the natural father should 
pay all expenses "not covered or al-
lowed by her present health and ma-
jor medical insurance, including all 
extraordinary medical expenses and 
all reasonable expenses for treat-
ment of any emotional or mental 
conditions or problems related to 
said pregnancy."57 What is deemed 
"reasonable" expenses for "emo-
tional problems"? Who makes this 
determination? If counseling results 
in the surrogate's decision not to re-
linquish the child, is the surrogate 
financially liable? If the natural fa-
ther pays, does he have a role in di-
recting the medical and psychologi-
cal care provided? In the end, it may 
be the physician who ultimately de-
termines the "success" of the surro-
gacy deal for all the parties. The 
health care professional will be 
forced to balance the patient's needs 
with financial, legal, and ethical un-
certainties. 
The Birth 
When Baby M was born, no one on 
the hospital staff appeared to know 
that the baby was the "product" of a 
surrogate contract. The court de-
scribed the following scene: 
Not wishing anyone at the hos-
liS 
pita! to be aware of the surro-
gacy arrangement, Mr. and 
11rs. Whitehead appeared to all 
u~e proud parents of a healthy 
female child .... In accordance 
with Mrs. Whitehead's request, 
the Sterns visited the hospital 
unobtrusively to see the new-
born child. 58 
Contrary to a specific provision in 
the contract, 59 Ms. Whitehead 
named the child Sara Elizabeth 
Whitehead on the birth certificate 
and Mr. Whitehead was named as 
the father.60 In short, the hospital 
staff had been deceived. 
But what if the facts had been 
different? What if the hospital staff 
had known of the arrangement and 
the mother appeared to have a con-
flict about relinquishing the baby? 
Should the physician or nurse have 
let the mother hold or nurse the 
baby? Such action might encourage 
even more bonding or attachment-
something not agreed to in the con-
tract, but standard practice. In fact, 
some proposed surrogate contracts 
provide that the surrogate not 
breast-feed following the birth. And 
who would take the baby home at 
the time of discharge? Without a 
court order or formal proof of relin-
quishment for adoption, most hos-
pitals would re1ease a child only to 
the natural mother. Hospital policy 
and fear of liability would not allow 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, what if the baby 
had not been born healthy? Which 
parent would be granting consent-
or denying it-for immediate medi-
cal care? If Baby M had needed med-
ical care, the hospital staff would 
have sought the consent from Mr. 
and 11s. Whitehead. They did not 
know that the natural father was 
Mr. Stern. The Whiteheads ap-
peared to be the legal guardians at 
the time of birth. But what if there 
had been a conflict about medical 
care? Or what if the baby had been 
deformed and no one wanted to take 
responsibility? The physician could 
have been forced--as one doctor 
was in a 1983 case--to get a court 
order to treat the medical problems 
of a child born with microcephaly.6 ' 
The disappointment of having a less 
than perfect child is hard for any 
parent to accept. It is also one of the 
most difficult problems for the phy-
sician to work out with parents. In 
fact, hospital ethics committees have 
been formed to assist the medical 
staff and family make complex eth-
ical and medical decisions about 
treatment for severely defective new-
borns. To further complicate mat-
ters, the physician and the hospital 
staff would have to figure out which 
possible parent speaks on behalf of 
the best interests of the child. 
There have been a few failed at-
tempts to regulate decision-making 
at the time a surrogate mother gives 
birth. Some proposals would give 
authority to the natural mother 
through birth and immediately 
thereafter, 62 while others would 
shift authority at the time of viabil-
ity to the natural father and his 
wife. 6 3 For the physician and the 
hospital staff, it seems safest to place 
these decisions with the natural 
mother, assuming that she is acting 
in the best interests of the child. But 
what if the natural mother then re-
linquishes the less than perfect baby 
to the natural father, pursuant to the 
contract? He may not want the 
"damaged goods" either; the child 
could be abandoned by all parties.64 
In a recent case reported in the New 
England Journal of Medicine, a sur-
rogate mother passed HIV infection 
to the fetus. Neither the surrogate 
nor the natural father wanted cus-
tody of the infant. 65 
Even if a natural father is 
granted custody, he may not have 
had a role in the medical decision-
making process at birth. The physi-
cian may not have known of the sur-
rogacy arrangement. Faced with 
significant medical and related ex-
penses for his defective child, the fa-
ther, having had no input into the 
medical decisions involved, may 
Law, Medicine & Health Care 
look for a "deep pocket" to sue. 
Both the health care professional 
and the hospital will face an increas-
ing risk of liability from all parties. 
Conclusion 
Baby M was not a case about health 
care professionals. Yet examination 
of the surrogacy contract reveals the 
importance of the health care pro-
fessional as a player in the process. 
From the initial evaluation of the 
surrogate mother through the birth 
of the contracted-for child, health 
care professionals face a number of 
complex legal and ethical questions. 
Many of these questions have no an-
swers. If state legislatures begin to 
regulate surrogacy, health care pro-
fessionals will be expected to assume 
an increasing role as "guarantors" 
in the process. This is a role that the 
health care professional should not 
accept without a clear recognition of 
the inevitable conflicts. 
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